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STATEMENT OF THE CASE

Michael

appeals, contending that three different errors

during

his trial and sentencing: (1) there was a fatal variance between the charging document
the jury instructions on the aggravated assault charge; (2) the district court failed to
give his appropriately-requested instruction on the necessity defense; and (3) the district
court refused to allow him to challenge the information in the presentence investigation
report (hereinafter, PSI) at the sentencing hearing. The State responds, contending that
was no fatal variance, the

necessity instruction was not supported by

evidence, and the district court did not abuse its discretion in

decisions

surrounding the PSI materials.
However, the State's specific arguments in support of those contentions are not
relevant to the appropriate analyses of the issues raised in this appeal. This reply is
necessary to refocus on the appropriate analyses for these issues. Because of those
three errors, this Court should vacate the judgment and remand this case for a new trial,
or, at least, remand this case for new sentencing.

Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings
The statement of the facts and course of proceedings were previously articulated
in Mr. Detwiler's Appellant's Brief. They need not be repeated in this Reply Brief, but
are incorporated herein by reference thereto.
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ISSUES
1.

Whether there was a fatal
nc""'"
the charging document
instructions as they
to the charge of aggravated assault

2.

Whether the district court erred by not instructing the jury as to the necessity
defense.

3.

Whether the district court abused its discretion by refusing
allow Mr. Detwiler
to challenge the information in the PSI, and by refusing to red line information
improperly included therein.
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ARGUMENT

L
There Was A Fatal Variance Between The Charging Document And The Jury
Instructions As They Related To The Charge Of Aggravated Assault
As the

acknowledges, a variance occurs when "the jury instructions given

at trial allow the jury to convict the defendant of the charged crime, but on one or more
alternative theories than alleged in the charging document."

(Resp.

, p.6 (citing

State v. Windsor, 110 Idaho 410 (1985), and State v. Montoya, 140 Idaho 160, 166
(Ct. App. 2004).)

Under this rule, since the charging document in this case did not

allege that Mr. Detwiler had committed assault under the theory of attempted battery

(see R., p.51 ), and the jury was nevertheless instructed on that theory
attempt (R., p.240), there was a variance in this case.

assault-by-

Thus, the only question

remaining is whether this variance is fatal (i.e., constitutes a constructive amendment),
and so, demands that Mr. Detwiler receive a new trial.
The State also acknowledges that "[a] constructive amendment occurs if a
variance alters the charging document to the extent that the defendant is tried for a
crime of greater degree or a different nature."

(Resp. Br., pp.6-7 (citing State v.

Jones, 140 Idaho 41, 49 (Ct. App. 2003), and State v. Colwell, 124 Idaho 560, 566
(Ct. App. 1993) (emphasis added)).)

However, the State goes on to argue that,

because the actus reus would be the same under either theory of assault, this variance
is not a constructive amendment. (Resp. Br., pp.7-9.)
The first problem with the State's argument on this issue is that it ignores a
fundamental tenet of criminal law: "In every crime or public offense there must exist a
union, or joint operation, of act and intent, or criminal negligence."
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I.C. § 18-114

(emphasis added).

To simply say, as the State has in this case, that the alleged

conduct would be criminal under either theory because both theories have the same
actus reus component gives no effect to the intent components of each theory. That is

inconsistent with the requirement that both act and intent are necessary to show
criminal conduct.

In fact, the State's argument is particularly problematic since the

State is required to prove the associated intent element beyond a reasonable doubt.
State v. Searcy, 118 Idaho 632, 636 n.5 (1990) (discussing the State's burden of proof

regarding mens rea elements of a charged offense).

As such, adopting the State's

argument and allowing it to ignore the associated intent components of the theories of
assault would effectively reduce its burden of proof in such cases, and thus, would
violate the Constitutional protections of due process and fair trial. See, e.g., State v.
Keaveny, 136 Idaho 31, 33 (2000).

The State's argument also fails to recognize that the two theories of assault are
different in nature because they have different mens rea elements.
State v. McDougall, 113 Idaho 900, 903 (Ct. App. 1988).

See, e.g.,

Since the two theories are

different in nature, the variance is fatal. Assault-by-threat requires that the defendant
intentionally threaten to do harm which creates a well-founded fear in the victim.
I. C. § 18-901 (b ).

Therefore, the requisite mens rea is that the defendant acted with

"'an actual intention to cause apprehension."' McDougal/, 113 Idaho at 903 (quoting
2 W. Lafave & A. Scott, Jr., SUBSTANTIVE CRIMINAL LAW§§ 3.4-3.5 p.316 (1986).)
There is no requirement that the defendant ever intend to actually cause any harm to
the victim under the assault-by-threat theory of assault. See id.

On the other hand,

assault-by-attempt requires that the defendant attempt "to commit a violent injury on the
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person of another." I.C. § 18-901 (a). Therefore, unlike the assault-by-threat theory, the
requisite mens rea for the assault-by-attempt theory of assault does require that the
defendant act with "'an intent to cause physical injury to the victim." McDougall, 113
Idaho at 903 (quoting 2 W. LaFave & A. Scott, Jr., at p.313).

Thus, the mens rea

requirements for the two alternative theories of assault are different and distinct: there
is the intention to cause apprehension, and '"the morally worse intention to cause bodily
harm."' Id. (quoting 2 W. LaFave & A. Scott, Jr., at p.316); accord State v. Crowe, 135
Idaho 43, 46 (Ct. App. 2000). This makes the nature of the two theories of assault very
different. Therefore, because the two theories of assault are different in nature, the
State's argument that the variance in this case does not require a new trial is erroneous
and should be rejected.
Furthermore, the Idaho Supreme Court has specifically discussed this precise
question, albeit in dicta, and explained that, where the jury instructions add to or alter
the intent element identified in the charging document, that constitutes a fatal variance.
State v. Tribe, 123 Idaho 721, 725 n.5 (1993).

In Tribe, the information accused the

defendant of "having tortured his wife with an intent to cause suffering or to satisfy some
sadistic inclination." Id. However, the jury instruction provided that one of the elements
of the offense was that the defendant "tortured his wife 'with the intent to cause
suffering, to execute vengeance, to extort something from [her] or to satisfy some
sadistic inclination."' Id. (emphasis added). The Supreme Court found that instruction
to be problematic "because it presented four possibilities to the jury, any one of which
could be the one upon which the jury reached its verdict. ... This additional language

further muddies the waters as to whether all twelve jurors agreed that Tribe acted with
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requisite intent." Id. (emphasis from original).

As a result, the Court found that, by

instructing the jury on potential intent elements that were not included in the charging
documents, there was "a fatal variance between the instructions and the charge of the
prosecutor's amended information."

/cl.

This was true even though the associated

actus reus would have been the same, regardless of which of the four intents the jurors

found.
The discussion in Tribe regarding variances has since been adopted by a
majority of the Idaho Supreme Court:

"When the criminal statute provides different

ways for committing the crime, the jury instructions should be appropriately tailored to fit
the allegations in the charging instrument." State v. Tiffany, 139 Idaho 909, 918 (2004)
(relying on Tribe, 123 Idaho at 731 n.5) (overruled on other grounds by State v. Suriner,
154 Idaho 81 (2013)).

However, the variance in Tiffany was not fatal because no

evidence had been presented that could have supported the alternative theory of the
crime included in the jury instructions. Tiffany, 139 Idaho at 917-18. Therefore, there
was no chance that the jury convicted the defendant on the erroneously-instructed
theory. Id. Contrarily, as the State has argued in this case, the underlying facts speak
to both theories of the crime. (Resp. Br., p.13.) Therefore, unlike in Tiffany, there was
evidence offered on the uncharged alternative theory.
As a result, the failure to appropriately tailor the jury instructions to fit the means
alleged in the charging document constitutes a fatal variance. See Tiffany, 139 Idaho at
918. The jury instruction in this case allowed the jury to convict Mr. Detwiler on a crime
of a different nature than the one alleged in the charging document. Compare Tribe,
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123 Idaho at 725 n.5.

As even the State concedes (Resp. Br., pp.6-7), when that

happens, the variance is clear, reversible error.
Additionally, it is clear that the jurors were discussing the mens rea and intent
components of the alleged crime.

(See Exhibits, p.28 (the jury's question about the

evidence necessary to find the requisite intent for aggravated assault).) As such, there
is a reasonable possibility that, had the jurors been properly instructed, their verdict
would have been different. Thus, the fact that the district court referred the jurors back
to the erroneous instruction when they posed a question specifically about the intent
element demonstrates that there is a reasonable possibility that erroneous instruction
impacted the verdict in this case. Since that clear error, which touches on Mr. Detwiler's
constitutional right to a fair trial, was prejudicial, it is fundamental error.
State v. Perry, 150 Idaho 209, 226 (2010).

See

Therefore, this Court should vacate

Mr. Detwiler's conviction and remand this case for a new trial.

II.
The District Court Erred By Not Instructing The Jury As To The Necessity Defense
The State's argument as to whether a necessity instruction was required in
this case is fundamentally flawed because it is entirely based on the presumption
that Mr. Detwiler's version of events may be wholly discounted in the analysis.
(See generally Resp. Br., pp.11-14.) For example, the State contends that Mr. Detwiler
did not present sufficient evidence that he was in danger because, while he testified that
there was a group of men at his car trying to attack him, Ms. Haynes had testified that
those men were simply "telling [Mr.] Detwiler to leave the area" and Mr. Detwiler was
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the men. 1 (Resp.

, p.13.)

Mr. Detwiler had not
elements of

on that conflicting testimony,
sufficient evidence on one of the

necessity defense (that there was a specific threat of imminent harm).

(Resp. Br., p.1

)

The State also contends that, because there was evidence

suggesting that Mr. Detwiler had provoked the situation with the comments he made
back inside the bar, he had not presented sufficient evidence on another element of the
defense (that he did not cause the threatening situation). (Resp. Br.,

13.) Based on

these assertions, the State concludes, "[Mr.] Detwiler failed to make a prima facie case
on each element of his proposed affirmative defense," and so, the district court properly
refused to

the requested instruction. (Resp. Br., p.14.)

The State's arguments are irrelevant to

proper analysis; credibility of the

witnesses and weight of the evidence is not part of the consideration of whether an
instruction should be given. "It is a well-settled principle of law that, though the court
may not believe the testimony of a defendant and witnesses corroborating him, the
solemn duty rests upon the court to instruct the jury as fairly and impartially upon the
theory of defense as upon the theory of prosecution." State v. Moultrie, 43 Idaho 766,
_ , 254 P. 520, 523 (1927); accord State v. Scroggie, 110 Idaho 103, 110-11 (Ct. App.
1986), overruled on other grounds in State v. Porter, 142 Idaho 371, 375 (2005).

The State's summary of Ms. Haynes testimony does not square with Ms. Haynes'
actual statements. For example, she testified that there was a lot of shouting by the
men who were surrounding Mr. Detwiler's car, and she had to tell them to back off.
(Tr., Vol.4, p.200, L.25 - p.201, L.22.) In fact, she testified that she did not think it would
have been safe for Mr. Detwiler to have gotten out of the car. (Tr., Vol.1, p.260, Ls.1216.) Thus, the State's assertion that the men were simply telling Mr. Detwiler to leave is
inconsistent with the evidence presented. It also does not account for the boot print that
was found on the door of Mr. Detwiler's car. (Tr., Vol.4, p.342, Ls.15-17.)
1
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As such, when "[t]here was testimony supporting it and, if believed by the jury, would
have required a verdict of not guilty," the requested instruction should have been given.
State v. White, 46 Idaho 124, _ , 266 P. 415, 418-19 (1928) (citing Moultrie, 43 Idaho

766); accord State v. Pearce, 146 Idaho 241, 247-48 (2008). Thus, the appropriate rule
is:

'"A defendant is entitled to an affirmative instruction applicable to his testimony

based upon the hypothesis that it is true, when his testimony affects a material issue of
the case."'

State v. Huskinson, 71 Idaho 82, 88 (1951) (quoting Dismore v. State,

44 P.2d 894, 895 (Okla. Crim. App. 1935)).
The idea that a defendant should be afforded an instruction "based on the
hypothesis that it is true" is, of course, premised on the fact that he has presented
evidence speaking to all the elements of the proposed defense.
State v. Camp, 134 Idaho 662, 665-66 (Ct. App. 2000).

See, e.g.,

Therefore, upon presenting

such evidence, the defendant is entitled to an instruction if, given the hypothesis that his
evidence is true, there is a possibility that the jury could have returned a not guilty
verdict. 2 See Huskinson, 71 Idaho at 88; cf. State v. Mojica, 95 Idaho 326, 327 (1973)
(pointing out "[w]hile the defendant presented evidence sufficient for the jury to consider
his defense of entrapment, [the jurors] were entitled to disbelieve the defendant and to

rely on the agent's testimony and find for the State on the issue of guilt") (emphasis
added). Where the district court fails to properly instruct the jury in such cases, the
Idaho Supreme Court has held: "Since no other instructions were given presenting the

2

This is true even if the jury might ultimately not believe the defendant's evidence, or
find contradictory evidence more credible. The determination of whether or not to give
an affirmative defense instruction is assessed presuming that the defendant's evidence
will be believed. Huskinson, 71 Idaho at 88.
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theory of appellant's defense, we conclude that it was reversible error to deny
appellant's request to give the [requested] instructions." State v. McGlochlin, 85 Idaho
459, 466-67 (1963) (quoting Moultrie, 254 P. at 523).
In this case, Mr. Detwiler's testimony, combined with the other evidence in the
case (for example, the boot mark on his door and the testimony that it would not have
been safe for Mr. Detwiler to exit the car) which reinforced Mr. Detwiler's testimony that
he was being assaulted while he was in his car, was sufficient to allow him to present a
necessity defense to the jury. There was a reasonable view of the evidence (i.e., if the
jurors had believed Mr. Detwiler over Ms. Haynes) that supported the requested
instruction. (See App. Br., pp.12-15 (discussing in detail the evidence presented that
speaks to each element of the necessity defense).)

The State's argument - that,

because the jury might have believed Ms. Haynes, and so ultimately rejected the
defense - is simply not a valid reason for the district court to have refused to give the
instruction in the first place. See, e.g., Moultrie, 254 P. at 523. So long as a reasonable

view of the evidence would support the instruction (i.e., given the hypothesis that
Mr. Detwiler's evidence is true), the district court is required to give the instruction.

State v. Howley, 128 Idaho 874, 878 (1996); State v. Tadlock, 136 Idaho 413, 414
(Ct. App. 2001 ).
Similarly, just because there are alternative explanations as to who or what
triggered the confrontation at the car does not mean that Mr. Detwiler did not present
sufficient evidence to justify getting the instruction.

Rather, there was evidence that

Ms. Haynes had managed to quell the situation in the bar and Mr. Detwiler was
packing up his things, preparing to leave, which suggests that, when the people inside

10

the bar followed Mr. Detwiler outside, they were initiating a new confrontation which

Mr. Detwiler did not instigate. (See App. Br., pp.13-14.) It is the jury's job to determine
which evidence is ultimately credible, but given the hypothesis that Mr. Detwiler's
evidence was true, that evidence supports his assertion that he did not cause the
threatening situation, and therefore, he presented sufficient evidence to merit the
necessity instruction. Huskinson, 71 Idaho at 88; see also Mojica, 95 Idaho at 327.
The State makes another, related argument directed specifically at Mr. Detwiler's
assertions about the "least offensive means" element of the necessity defense.
Specifically, it contends that Mr. Detwiler could have driven safely away, rather than
driving forward (and thus, towards the alleged victim), and so, Mr. Detwiler failed to
present sufficient evidence that his actions were the least offensive means to escape
the potential harm.

(Resp. Br., pp.13-14.)

In making that argument, the State

completely ignores, rather than tries to mitigate against, Mr. Detwiler's testimony. As
before, that sort of argument is irrelevant to whether the necessity instruction was
appropriate.
Mr. Detwiler testified that he did, in fact, try to drive in reverse and leave the
parking lot, but that doing so did not free him from the threatening situation:
As soon as [Ms. Haynes] left the area of my car, walked over towards the
tree, this black guy came up and he opened my car door. And he said,
"Get the [expletive deleted] out of the car. You're going to get out of the
car." And he had the door open .... And I put the car in reverse, and
he started to come closer into my car . ... So I was thinking that [going]
forward would break this guy away from my door and give me enough
chance to lock the doors, which is what I did.
(Tr., Vol.4, p.386, L.9 - p.387, L.2 (emphasis added).) Ms. Haynes' testimony supports
Mr. Detwiler's assertion that he had initially backed up, and then drove forward.
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(Tr., Vol.4 p.204, Ls.19-23; Tr., Vol.4, p.275, Ls.3-9.) Therefore, contrary to the State's
assertion, there was evidence indicating that Mr. Detwiler had tried to back out and it
was unsuccessful in resolving the threatening situation. As a result there is evidence
that Mr. Detwiler's actions were the "least offensive means" available.
Since the jury could have believed Mr. Detwiler's account, there was a
reasonable view of the evidence which supported the instruction. As before, it does not
matter whether or not the jurors would have ultimately believed Mr. Detwiler's account;
he was still entitled to have the jury consider his defense based on the evidence
presented at trial. E.g. Huskinson, 71 Idaho at 88; Moutrie, 254 P. at 523. Therefore,
the State's argument on the "least offensive means" element is similarly irrelevant and
should be rejected.

Because Mr. Detwiler presented sufficient evidence to merit a

necessity instruction, the district court erred by not giving that instruction. As such, this
Court should vacate the judgment of conviction and remand for a new trial where the
jury is properly instructed.

111.
The District Court Abused Its Discretion By Refusing To Allow Mr. Detwiler To
Challenge The Information In The PSI, And By Refusing To Redline Information
Improperly Included Therein
The State contends that the district court provided Mr. Detwiler with an
opportunity challenge the contents of the PSI at a continued hearing, and thus, because
defense counsel decided not to take advantage of that opportunity, the district court did
not abuse its discretion by not allowing Mr. Detwiler to challenge the contents of the PSI
at the sentencing hearing.

(Resp. Br., pp.15-18.)

That argument ignores the rule

clearly articulated by the Idaho Court of Appeals: "it is at the sentencing hearing-and
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not beyond-that the defendant is given the opportunity to object to [the PSl's]
contents." 3 State v. Person, 145 Idaho 293, 296 (Ct. App. 2007).

The district court

made it very clear that it was not going to entertain objections to the contents of the PSI
at the sentencing hearing: 'Tm not going to red-line or remove anything at this point.
The PSI says what it says," and "I'm not removing anything at this point from the PSI."
(Tr., Vol.5, p.27, Ls.12-14; Tr., Vol.5, p.28, Ls.15-16.) In taking that position, the district
court allowed unreliable information to remain in the PSI.

That position is directly

contrary to the rule from Person, and so, it constitutes an abuse of the district court's
discretion.
As such, even if continuing the sentencing hearing were an appropriate option
under Person, the fact that the district court refused to make note of Mr. Oetwiler's
challenges at the sentencing hearing which actually took place is still not acceptable.
Therefore, the State's argument on this issue is meritless and should be rejected.
Because the district court abused its discretion at the sentencing hearing which actually
occurred, Mr. Detwiler's sentence should be vacated and the case remanded for a new
sentencing with a proper PSI.

See, e.g., State v. Mauro, 121 Idaho 178, 183 (1991);

State v. Molen, 148 Idaho 950, 961 (Ct. App. 2010).

The State has not argued that this rule is erroneous or otherwise contended that it
should be abandoned. (See generally Resp. Br.) In fact, it has not acknowledged that
rule at all. .(See generally Resp. Br.)
3
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CONCLUSION
Mr. Detwiler respectfully requests that this Court vacate his judgment of

conviction and remand this case for a new trial.

Alternatively, he requests that this

Court vacate his sentence and remand the case for a new sentencing hearing with an
instruction to allow him an adequate opportunity to challenge the information in the PSI
materials.
DATED this 5th day of November, 2014.

BRIAN R. DICKSON
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender
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